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The Supreme Court as Guardian of the Environment:
The Metropolitan Edison Decision in Perspective
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 was enacted as
a means of protecting the environment from degradation caused by
technological advances.2 Since the enactment of NEPA, the Su-
preme Court has clearly established the role of the judiciary in en-
vironmental litigation in the context of NEPA and otherwise. 8 The
function of the courts, as delineated by the Supreme Court, is to
determine whether a federal agency has considered the environ-
mental consequences of its actions.4 In carrying out this duty, the
courts have been specifically instructed to avoid substantive review
of the conclusions reached by the agency regarding the environ-
mental effects of its actions.5 Instead of ultimately deciding
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4367 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
2. Senator Jackson, in introducing the original bill, stated that "[we] are ... only
reacting to crisis situations in the environmental field. What we should be doing is setting
up institutions and procedures designed to anticipate environmental problems before they
reach the crisis stage." Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1969). See Comment, NEPA, The
Supreme Court and the Future of Environmental Litigation, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 403 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980)
(NEPA requirements are satisfied whenever an agency has followed the appropriate proce-
dures for considering the environmental consequences of its actions); Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (NEPA's
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural, and courts are not to set aside administra-
tive decisions simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached); Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (in the absence of a proposal for regional coal development, there
is no NEPA mandate for a regional environmental impact analysis); Aberdeen and Rockfish
Railroad v. SCRAP (II), 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (Interstate Commerce Commission is not re-
quired to consider environmental issues until it makes a recommendation or report on a
proposal for federal action). See also 10 ENvTL. L. 643 (1980) and 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 403
(1978) for a detailed analysis of this trend.
4. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980),
in which the Court stated: "[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's proce-
dural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences." See also 10 ENVTL. L. 643, 654 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) which states that the decisions reached by an admin-
istrative agency should be set aside "only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons
as mandated by the statute, not simply because the court is unhappy with the result
reached." See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. See also 10 ENVTL. L. 643 (1980).
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whether an agency made a sound decision from an environmental
perspective, the courts are limited to reviewing whether the agency
has followed the procedural requirements in reaching its final deci-
sion regardless of the merits of that decision.'
Recently, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy,7 the Supreme Court reinforced its position that substan-
tive policy decisions regarding environmental protection should
not be made in the courts, by refusing to judicially broaden the
scope of NEPA to require consideration of psychological health
impacts in the process of environmental review. The purpose of
this comment is to examine the treatment given to environmental
protection by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Edison and
place it in perspective with the approach taken by the Court on
previous occasions.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT POLICY ACT
NEPA was enacted in response to widespread public concern
that man's activities were causing irreversible environmental deg-
radation.8 Because of this concern, NEPA was enacted as a decla-
ration of a national environmental policy with provisions providing
for the implementation of that policy.9
Initially, the Act defines as national policy the creation of "con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive har-
mony."'10 The Act places responsibility on the federal government
6. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), in which the Court states that NEPA's mandate "is to
insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges
... would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency."
See also 10 ENvTL. L. 643 (1980).
7. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
8. In declaring the national environmental policy, the Act specifically recognizes "the
profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, high density urban-
ization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological
advances .. " National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976).
9. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSuLAR AFFAm, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 9, 10, 14 (1969). For a more detailed
discussion of the NEPA legislation, see Comment, supra note 2.
10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(1) (1976) provides:
The Congress recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrela-
tions of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influ-
ences of population growth, high density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource
exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances .and recognizing further
the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the
overall welfare and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of
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to carry out this policy,"' and also recognizes that each person
should enjoy a healthful environment and have a corollary respon-
sibility to contribute to the preservation of the environment. 12
The remainder of the Act is devoted to implementation of the
Act in a manner which incorporates consideration of environmen-
tal factors into the activities of an agency.'3 Essentially, the pri-
mary method of placing environmental considerations into the de-
cision-making process of federal agencies is the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)."4 An EIS is intended to
the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other
concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and mea-
sures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster
and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976) provides:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing respon-
sibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans,
functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may -
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-
tion, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage; and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attaina-
ble recycling of depletable resources.
Id.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1976) provides: "The Congress recognizes that each person
should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contrib-
ute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976) requires that federal agencies:
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning
and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council
on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter which will
insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical
considerations;
Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976) requires that federal agencies:
include in every recommendation or report or proposals for legislation and other
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insure that the policies and goals defined in NEPA are infused into
the activities of the federal government."5
This important piece of legislation has been the subject of volu-
minous case law attempting to sort out the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of NEPA. In the past, the Supreme Court has
taken the position that the judiciary's role in environmental litiga-
tion is limited to the procedural aspects of agency behavior under
NEPA. 17 This approach set the stage for the Court's most recent
decision in Metropolitan Edison.
III. Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear
Energy
In Metropolitan Edison, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, held that NEPA does not require the consideration of psy-
chological health impacts resulting from the fear of an accident at
a nuclear generating facility.18 Metropolitan Edison arose as a re-
sult of an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant1"
on March 28, 1978, which damaged the second nuclear reactor unit
(TMI-2), causing widespread anxiety and the evacuation of many
area residents.20 At the time of the accident, Three Mile Island
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Id.
15. 40 C.F.R. 1502.1 (1982). Additionally, an EIS functions as a device by which more
informed decisions can be made: "[An EIS] shall provide full and fair discussion of signifi-
cant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasona-
ble alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of
the human environment." Id.
16. See Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Gen-
eration of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D.L. Rxv. 279 (1974).
17. See supra note 3. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 1561-62. The decision was unanimous. A concurring opinion was filed
by Justice Brennan. Id. at 1564 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19. Three Mile Island (TMI) is a two reactor nuclear power plant near Middletown,
Pennsylvania. TMI is owned by Metropolitan Edison Co., Jersey Central Power and Light
Co., and Pennsylvania Electric Co., subsidiaries of General Public Utilities Corp. Brief for
Appellant at i, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556
(1983).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 1558.
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Unit 1 (TMI-1) had been taken out of operation for refueling.21
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ordered that TMI-1
remain out of operation until the NRC determined that TMI-1
could be operated safely.2 2 Subsequent to the accident the NRC
held extensive hearings pertaining to the reactivation of TMI-1,
but refused to consider the potential psychological harm to neigh-
boring residents and economic and social deterioration in sur-
rounding communities that might result from the renewed opera-
tion of the undamaged TMI-1, limiting its inquiry to issues
directly related to radiation exposure.2 8
People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE),2 ' objected to the failure
of the NRC to consider the impact of psychological stress and com-
munity well-being, and sought judicial review of the NRC's deci-
sion."5 In response to PANE's petition, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that NEPA required the NRC to ad-
dress the potential psychological health effects associated with
stress resulting from the renewed operation of TMI-1.26 The court
of appeals determined that medically recognized psychological
stress impacts were encompassed within the NEPA mandate for




24. PANE is an association of neighbors of TMI opposed to further operation of the
TMI facility. Id.
25. Id. The order and notice of hearing published by the NRC on August 9, 1979
stated: "While real and substantial concern attaches to issues such as psychological distress
and others arising from the continuing impact of aspects of the Three Mile Island accident
unrelated directly to exposure to radiation. . . the Commission has not determined whether
such issues can be legally relevant to this proceeding." 10 NRC 148 (1979). Parties wishing
to raise such issues were invited to submit briefs for consideration by the NRC Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board. Id.
By vote of the NRC Commissioners, the NRC hearing regarding the restart of TMI was
conducted without consideration of psychological distress and community deterioration is-
sues. Also, the NRC staff excluded these issues from its environmental impact appraisal,
which recommended that no environmental impact statement be prepared in connection
with the proposed reactivation. People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Regulatory
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
26. 678 F.2d at 225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also 103 S. Ct. at 1559.
27. 678 F.2d at 227-28. The court relied on the language of NEPA which requires that
each agency utilize a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts." 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(A) (1982). Additionally, the court cited Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United
States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975), which considered the applicability of NEPA
to considerations of emotional and physical isolation stemming from occupancy of a high-
rise apartment building. The court stated that a NEPA-mandated environmental impact
analysis "must consider these human factors." Id. at 388.
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pealed, 8 and the Supreme Court reversed. 9
The Supreme Court reached its decision in Metropolitan Edison
by formulating a standard for determining which impacts are cog-
nizable "environmental effects" under NEPA based upon the
Court's interpretation of the purpose of the NEPA legislation. 0
The Court first examined the basic mandate contained in section
102 of NEPA which requires that an agency evaluate the environ-
mental impacts and the unavoidable adverse environmental effects
of any proposal significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment.81 The Court rejected an overbroad definition of "ad-
verse environmental effects" and determined that the NEPA man-
date is limited to adverse effects on only the physical
environment,32 rather than allowing NEPA to extend to assess-
ment of every conceivable impact or effect of a proposed action, no
matter how remote that impact may be.33 The broad language con-
tained in NEPA regarding the health and welfare of man, accord-
ing to the Court, is a statement of the goals of NEPA to be
achieved through the protection of the physical environment and is
not a statement of the scope of the environmental assessment re-
quired by NEPA.
3 4
28. Certiorari was granted at 103 S. Ct. 292 (1982).
29. 103 S. Ct. 1556, 1558 (1983).
30. See generally 103 S. Ct. at 1560-62. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1560. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(c) (1976), directs all federal agencies to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (and)
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented .
Id.
32. 103 S. Ct. at 1560. In support of this interpretation the Court refers to the Confer-
ence Report of two principal sponsors of NEPA which indicates that NEPA addresses
"damage to the air, land, and water which support life on earth" and that NEPA will "pre-
serve and enhance our air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments...." Id. See 115 CONG.
Rac. 40,416 (1969) and 115 CONG. REc. 40,924 (1969).
33. 103 S. Ct. at 1560.
34. Id. As an example, the Court referred to National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) which provides:
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.
Id. Other sections contain similarly broad language. The National Environmental Policy Act
484
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Based upon this interpretation, that NEPA is limited to protec-
tion of the physical environment, the Court then formulated a
standard for determining which environmental effects fall within
the scope of NEPA. The standard set forth by the Court requires
that the terms "environmental effect" and "environmental impact"
encompass only those effects having a reasonably close causal rela-
tionship to the physical environment.3 5 As a result, if a harm is too
remote from the physical environment, it is not to be assessed as
an environmental impact under NEPA. 6
As an example of the application of this standard, the Court
presented a hypothetical situation in which the Department of
Health and Human Services created very stringent requirements
for hospitals receiving federal funds.8 7 As a result of this action,
many hospitals might be forced to close down, causing a shortage
of health care facilities resulting in health damage to ill people un-
able to receive treatment. 8 The Court indicated that NEPA would
not require an environmental impact analysis evaluating the health
damage because the health damage would not be proximately re-
lated to a change in the physical environment3 9
The Court applied the "proximate cause" standard in a similar
fashion to the situation presented in Metropolitan Edison. The
Court first identified the causal chain between the effect com-
plained of40  and the resultant change in the physical
environment.4
1
of 1969 § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1976) provides that "each person should enjoy a
healthful environment." The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(b) states that "it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to...
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings." Id.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 1561. The Court analogized this standard to the tort doctrine of prox-
imate cause. Id. See W. PRossan, LAW oF TORTS ch. 7 (4th ed. 1971).
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1560-61. "[C]ourts must look to the underlying policies or legislative
intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes that may make an
actor responsible for an effect and those that do not." Id. at 1561 n.7. See also United States
v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 25 (1958), in which the Court stated: "we cannot attribute to Congress
the intention to . . . open the door to such obvious incongruities and undesirable
possibilities."
37. 103 S. Ct. at 1561.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The effect at issue is the renewed operation of the undamaged nuclear reactor. 103
S. Ct. at 1561.
41. The physical effect complained of is the psychological health damage stemming
from the fear of a nuclear accident. Brief for Respondent at 23, Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
People Against Nuclear Energy, 103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983). See 103 S. Ct. at 1561.
1984
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The chain constructed by the Court was as follows: reactivation
of the nuclear generator will create a risk of nuclear accident which
will be perceived by PANE's members which will cause psychologi-
cal health damage.42 The elements of risk of an accident and the
perception of that risk are middle links in the causal chain identi-
fied by the Court.43 The presence of those middle links made the
harm too remote from the environment to require a NEPA evalua-
tion of psychological health damage caused by renewed operation
of TMI-1. 44 Therefore, the Court found that contentions of psycho-
logical health damage caused by risk of an accident are not within
the contemplation of NEPA.43
After formulating the standard by which the scope of NEPA is
limited, the Court discussed the purpose of NEPA in its role as
part of the general scheme of governmental regulation. The Court
advanced as the central purpose of NEPA the balancing of the
value of technological advances against the resulting alterations of
the physical environment. The Court stated that in order for this
mission to remain manageable, NEPA must be interpreted to ex-
clude consideration of these broader policy issues.46 The Court di-
rected that agency resources be devoted to the consideration of
protection of the physical environment as it relates to the assigned
function of that agency and not to the consideration of the broader
policy questions regarding whether the achievements brought forth
through a given technological advance are worth the perceived
risks.4 7 The result in this particular case was that the general de-
bate concerning the desirability of nuclear power generation is not
to be held in the context of environmental assessment under
NEPA.4 8 Consequently, the Court excluded NEPA as a means for
42. 103 S. Ct. at 1561-62. The Court noted PANE's contention that psychological
health damage will flow directly from the risk of an accident, but asserted that risk itself
cannot be a physical effect because "risk is, by definition, unrealized in the physical world."
Id. at 1562.
43. Id. "In a causal chain from renewed operation of TMI-1 to psychological health
damage, the element of risk and its perception by PANE's members are necessary middle
links." Id.
44. Id. "We believe that the element of risk lengthens the causal chain beyond the
reach of NEPA." Id.
45. Id. at 1561.
46. Id. at 1562. "Time and resources are simply too limited for us to believe that Con-
gress intended to extend NEPA as far as the Court of Appeals has taken it." Id.
47. Id. "If contentions of psychological health damage caused by risk were cognizable
under NEPA, agencies would, at the very least, be obliged to expend considerable resources
developing psychiatric expertise that is not otherwise relevant to their congressionally as-
signed functions." Id.
48. Id. The Court noted that PANE's original contention in this case seemed to ad-
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voicing general policy objections to a federal action and left these
broad policy questions to the political process.49
IV. Metropolitan Edison AND THE SUPREME COURT PERSPECTIVE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The exclusion from NEPA consideration of harms too remote
from the physical environment as provided by the Supreme Court
in Metropolitan Edison is entirely consistent with the Court's pre-
vious approach, found in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.50 The Vermont Yankee
controversy concerned the court's role in reviewing an agency's in-
ternal decision-making process. The dispute centered around the
sufficiency of the administrative procedures promulgated by the
Atomic Energy Commission to be followed in connection with the
preparation of NEPA mandated environmental impact statements
for the licensing of a nuclear generating facility.51 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held that the lower
court overstepped its bounds in dictating the procedure to be fol-
lowed by an agency in conducting substantive review of the envi-
ronmental consequences of its actions. 2 This decision cautioned
the courts against interference with an agency's substantive deci-
sion-making process by imposing judicially created procedural re-
quirements upon the agencies. 3 The general theme of the decision
was judicial restraint.6 4 Although the decision in Vermont Yankee
is more concerned with interference by the courts in procedural
matters of federal agencies,56 there is a tangential relationship to
dress the broader question of the desirability of continued nuclear power generation at the
TMI facility as much as it addressed the risk of an accident. Id. at 1563 n.12. For example,
PANE contended that "operation of [TMI-1J would be a constant reminder of the terror
which [local residents) felt during the accident, and of the possibility that it will happen
again. The distress caused by this ever present spectre of disaster makes it impossible...
to operate TMI-1 without endangering the public health and safety." 103 S. Ct. at 1562 n.2,
quoting Brief for Respondent, Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy,
103 S. Ct. 1556 (1983).
49. 103 S. Ct. at 1563. "Neither the language nor the history of NEPA suggest that it
was intended to give citizens a general opportunity to air their policy objections to proposed
federal actions." Id.
50. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
51. Id. at 525.
52. Id. at 555.
53. Id. at 541-42.
54. Id. at 557-58. See Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1833 (1978),
55. Id. at 524. See Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1978). See also 9
ENVTL. L. 653, 660-61.
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Metropolitan Edison in that Vermont Yankee is indicative of the
mood of the Court with respect to the judicial role in environmen-
tal protection.56
In this regard, Vermont Yankee can be considered the leading
case limiting the role of the judiciary in environmental regula-
tion.57 The opinion of the Court in Vermont Yankee specifically
indicated that courts are to play a limited role in the review pro-
cess established by Congress in its choice to develop nuclear en-
ergy.58 The Court stated that the judiciary is not to substitute its
own judgment for that of an agency in the area of the environmen-
tal consequences of agency actions, and cannot interject itself into
discretionary areas as to the choosing of the course of action to be
taken.5 The Vermont Yankee Court concluded that administra-
tive decisions should not be set aside simply because the court is
unhappy with the result reached,60 and that fundamental policy
questions appropriately resolved by the legislature are not subject
to reexamination in the courts under the guise of judicial review of
agency action.6'
The Metropolitan Edison decision was simply the next step in a
natural evolution of the previous cases concerning environmental
56. See 10 ENVTL. REV. 643 (1980), identifying and charting the trend of the Supreme
Court toward minimizing the substantive influence of NEPA in federal agency decision-
making. See supra note 3.
The most recent Supreme Court decision in the area prior to Metropolitan Edison was
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). The controversy in
Strycker's Bay centered around a decision by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) to redesignate a proposed housing site for a greater number of low income
units. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that since HUD had prepared an EIS con-
sidering the environmental consequences of the proposed action as required by NEPA, it
had fulfilled its duties under NEPA. The Court reiterated the position taken in Vermont
Yankee that NEPA, while establishing "significant substantive goals for the Nation," im-
poses upon agencies duties that are "essentially procedural." 444 U.S. at 227 (quoting 435
U.S. at 558). This decision has been interpreted as reducing NEPA to a procedural obstacle
in the path of agency action. See 10 ENVTL. L. at 654. See also Gray, NEPA: Waiting for the
Other Shoe to Drop, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 361 (1979); Comment, supra note 2.
57. See supra note 56.
58. 435 U.S. at 555. This position was taken from dicta in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390 (1976). "Neither the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a court
should substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences
of its actions. The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at
environmental consequences." 427 U.S. at 410 n.21. The question in Kleppe was whether
NEPA required the Department of the Interior to prepare an EIS for a coal mining project.
The Court held that no EIS was required in the absence of a proposal. Id. See 10 ENVTL. L.
643, 645 (1980).
59. 435 U.S. at 555. See supra note 58.
60. 435 U.S. at 558.
61. Id.
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protection . 2 The Metropolitan Edison Court used the policy deci-
sions enunciated in Vermont Yankee to formulate a working stan-
dard for identifying "environmental effects" within the contempla-
tion of NEPA. The standard requiring a reasonably close causal
relationship between a change in the physical environment and the
effect at issue6" results in a limitation of NEPA to assessment only
of effects on the physical environment." By limiting NEPA's focus
in this manner, the Court has determined that NEPA cannot be
used as a means of resolving policy disagreements under the guise
of assessment of risks associated with technological advances."
Consequently, fears or disagreements concerning a project which
may lead to psychological stress are not to be assessed under
NEPA but remain a subject for the political forum.6 In closing the
door of NEPA as a means of deciding general policy questions, the
Court was furthering its Vermont Yankee declaration that funda-
mental policy questions are appropriately resolved in Congress and
that Congress has made a choice in favor of nuclear energy, with
the courts playing a limited role in the review process.6 Through
the Metropolitan Edison decision, the Court has reinforced its ap-
proach as originally presented in Vermont Yankee that if the deci-
sion to develop nuclear energy should be proven wrong, it is Con-
gress, not the judiciary, which must eventually make that
decision."
V. CONCLUSION
Although the treatment given to environmental litigation by the
Supreme Court is often criticized as hostile to substantive environ-
62. See supra notes 3 and 56.
63. 103 S. Ct. at 1561. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
64. 103 S. Ct. at 1560. See supra note 40-45 and accompanying text.
65. 103 S. Ct. at 1562. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 1563. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
67. 435 U.S. at 558. See Breyer, supra note 54, at 1845.
68. 435 U.S. at 558. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Vermont Yankee,
specifically stated that:
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safi source of power or it may not. But
Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable
review process in which courts are to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy
questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not sub-
ject to reexamination in the federal courts under the guise of judicial review of agency
action. Time may prove wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Con-
gress or the States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make
that judgment. In the meantime courts should perform their appointed function.
Id. at 557-58 (emphasis in original).
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mental protection, 9 the Metropolitan Edison decision greatly
strengthens the substantive impact of NEPA. The Metropolitan
Edison decision accomplishes this by clearly defining NEPA's ob-
jective as the protection of the health and welfare of man through
the protection of the physical environment.70 By limiting NEPA's
scope to the protection of the physical environment rather than
including within its realm the broad policy issues behind the envi-
ronmental impact,7 the Court has limited NEPA to that which it
was intended to protect. Consequently, federal agencies conducting
environmental assessments must focus on this narrow issue and are
not required to expend their limited resources of time, money and
expertise on consideration of the broad policy issues behind the
activity in question.
7 2
The Metropolitan Edison decision imposes a standard which
limits NEPA consideration to those effects having a reasonably
close relationship to the physical environment. By protecting the
physical environment, NEPA's objective of the protection of
human health and welfare can be achieved. The Vermont Yankee
declaration that fundamental policy decisions must be made in the
political forum is also furthered by the elimination of NEPA as a
means of analyzing the underlying policies leading to activities
having an effect on the physical environment. The final result is
that by leaving policy questions to the political process, NEPA's
resources can be channelled to the protection of the physical envi-
ronment. In this manner, the limitations imposed by the Supreme
Court will promote the best interests of environmental protection.
Robert T. Vogler
69. See Gray, supra note 56, at 367; see also 10 ENVTL. L. 643, 654 (1980).
70. See supra note 32-34 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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